NEWS FROM JAPAN - JAPAN’S PACIFISM TAKES A HIT, READY TO RECLAIM DEMOCRACY

On September 19, the Upper House of the Japanese Diet voted the controversial national security legislation into law.

The new bills mark a drastic departure from Japan’s postwar security policy and run against the spirit and letter of the Japanese Constitution. The legislation now grants power to send Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) into overseas conflicts to defend allies in the name of collective self-defense, even if Japan itself is not under attack. It also expands the scope of SDF’s use of force in U.N. authorized military operations far beyond what has been permissible to date under war-renouncing Article 9.

The bills’ passage represents a political victory for Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who has long held ambitions to expand Japan's military posture around the world, under his pet-doctrine of “pro-active pacifism”. Since he has been in power, he has multiplied initiatives that challenge Japan’s longstanding peace policies, including re-interpreting Article 9, increasing the country’s military budget and relaxing the long-held arms export ban. The new legislation package codifies the contentious July 2014 Cabinet decision that reinterpreted the Constitution and puts the guidelines on Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, revised in April 2015, into effect.

UNPRECEDENTED OPPOSITION – Strong of its majority in both chambers of the Diet, Abe’s ruling coalition has railroaded the bills, despite adamant objections by a majority of the public.

Indeed, successive opinion polls have consistently shown that more than half of the population opposes the legislation, and even more so the process by which the laws were enacted, with three quarters of the public considering the government’s explanations insufficient and deliberations in the Diet inadequate. (see recent Asahi and Kyodo polls)

In the lead up to their adoption, opposition to the bills has grown steadily and led a new generation of activists, mostly students and youth in their 20s, to build an unprecedented grassroots movement of protest. For months, tens of thousands of people have rallied regularly in front of the Diet building in Tokyo and throughout the country to express their opposition to the legislation and voice their support for Japan’s peace constitution and democratic values.

The scale and diversity of popular mobilization are rather unusual in Japan – with the exception of the protests that forced Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (Abe's grandfather) to step down in 1960. Of particular interest is the involvement of segments of the population that have traditionally not been vocal in politics, such as mothers, youth, academics and former SDF members.

Yet, the Abe administration has largely disregarded the voices of citizens and failed to address the many concerns the bills have generated. Among such concerns: the ambiguity in how the principles of the legislation will be interpreted, the fact that its future implementation will be left largely to the discretion of the executive branch of future governments, and more generally the undemocratic and unconstitutional process through which the bills have been enacted.

ANTICONSTITUTIONAL BILLS - Criticism that the security legislation violates the constitution has been growing. Indeed, constitutional scholars and legal experts almost unanimously view the bills as unconstitutional and question the legitimacy of the July 2014 Cabinet decision on which the legislation is based. This has led a number of former Prime Ministers, high-rank Cabinet officials and Supreme Court judges to speak out. Among them, former Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau Miyazaki Reiichi, who stated the bills are “unacceptable in the light of war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution.”

Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Yamaguchi Shigeru explains: “If reinterpretation is necessary to respond to the changes in the international (security) situation, there is no other way but to revise the Constitution.” Reinterpreting the Constitution would undermine “constitutionalism,” he added, concluding that doing so would “make it impossible to control the use of power or protect citizens from arbitrary politics.”

Constitutional Law Professor Ishikawa Kenji from the University of Tokyo concurs, concluding “(Abe) harmed the continuity of Japan’s legal system based on the Constitution, as well as the continuity of general laws.” “That represents a revolution or a coup,” he said.

REGIONAL REACTIONS – At the regional level, the enactment of the new security legislation has been received with anxiety as well, especially from Japan’s neighbors still haunted by Japan’s WWII atrocities.

Qualifying the move as “unprecedented”, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei “solemnly urge[d] the Japanese side to learn hard lessons from history, pay heed to the call of justice from home and abroad, take seriously the security concerns of its Asian neighbors, stick to the path of peaceful development, act with discretion on military and security issues and do more to promote regional peace and stability, rather than the opposite.”

For its part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea called on the Japanese government to implement the new legislation “as it has repeatedly pledged … transparently and in a way that contributes to regional peace and stability, while upholding the spirit of its pacifist constitution which it has consistently maintained since the end of World War II.”

Such reactions echo the feeling at home that the move represent a fundamental change in Japan’s post-war security policy that may signal a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Most significantly, it speaks for the fact that Article 9 has played a key role in maintaining the fragile peace in the region. The adoption of the new laws thus raises concerns on how they will now influence the security landscape in Northeast Asia.

WHAT NOW? – It may be too early to assess whether the force of the mobilization will have a lasting impact on the way politics are run in Japan, as some predict.

It is clear, however, that for many in the opposition, the enactment of the bills is not the end of the story. “This is not an end,” wrote a senior lawmaker from the Democratic Party of Japan on Twitter. “Let’s make it the beginning of the beginning.” Many activists are resolved to keep up the pressure, and start a campaign to vote out politicians who supported the new laws in the Diet Upper House election that will take place mid next year. For its part, Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party is considering pushing for constitutional revision as the next logical step, so Article 9 may well remain at the top of the political agenda (and a key electoral issue) in the months to come.

In the meantime, scores of legal scholars are calling for the revocation of the security bills, and many groups are planning to file lawsuits disputing the legislation’s constitutionality, as the bills are based on a change of interpretation of the Constitution by the Cabinet – not on a constitutional revision. Article 98 of the Constitution stipulates that the Constitution is "the supreme law of the nation and no law…, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.”

However, Japanese courts cannot judge the constitutionality of a law per se. Any case challenging the validity of the legislation would need to be accompanied by claims of violations of rights by its defendants. Although the government has already started upgrading the SDF’s code of conduct to reflect the changes and expand the scope of when it can participate in combats overseas (notably in regard to Japan’s participation in the UN force in South Sudan), the new security legislation only comes into effect in March 2016. It may thus take time before courts can pronounce themselves on the issue.

In addition, Japan’s Supreme Court has traditionally not taken an active role in enforcing the constitution and even avoided, for the most part, delivering a clear verdict on issues considered "highly political" (such as national security). However, the almost unanimous scholarly objection to the legislation will be difficult to ignore. According to Tokyo University Constitutional Law Professor Ishikawa Kenji, “the Supreme Court is sensitive to the times and public opinion”. “There is a good chance to win if we have public support,” he said.

Many of those behind Japan’s vibrant mobilization are determined to sustain the momentum, with forceful appeals towards the revocation of the bills, the preservation of Japan’s democracy and pacific values, and the safeguard of Article 9 as a regional and global peace mechanism.

Read a piece by Campaign partner David Rothauser here.

Picture credit: Asahi Shimbun

WWII ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIONS – A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR RECONCILIATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

In August and September, countries in Northeast Asia held a series of commemorations to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, putting relations between Japan and its neighbors to test.

ABE’S STATEMENT – For months preceding, there was speculation about the wording of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s August 14 statement, and the impact it would have on regional relations, given historical recognition issues are a major point of contention.

Earlier this year, Abe had announced his intention to issue a “future-oriented statement fit for the 21st century,” rather than repeat the “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for Japan’s colonial rule and wartime aggression voiced by his predecessors, Prime Ministers Murayama Tomiichi and Koizumi Junichiro, in their statements issued on the 50th and 60th anniversaries respectively.

A key figure of Japan’s ideological conservative right, Abe is known for his nationalist agenda and his revisionist approach to Japan's history. The prospect that Abe would backslide on previous Japanese apologies generated anxiety across the region, notably in China and South Korea that suffered deeply from Japanese wartime aggression and colonization before and during World War II, and consider Japan has not done enough to atone for its wartime actions.

In Japan as well, a large majority of the population was in favor of an apology, as shown by public opinion polls. Groups of Japanese academics, journalists, lawyers and rights activists initiated a petition, urging Abe to renew explicit apologies for Japan’s wartime actions and take responsibility for the sexual enslavement of thousands of women.

ADVISORY PANEL – But Abe’s intention was clear: to feed into the expectations of his conservative constituency. In February, he set up a 16-member panel to advise him on what he should say in the statement. On August 6, the panel issued its report, recommending the statement describe World War II as an act of “aggression” against other Asian countries. Most of the panel members, however, were of the view that it didn't have to include “an apology,” to supposedly highlight its future-oriented nature.

FLAWED STATEMENT – On August 14, Abe issued his much anticipated statement, endorsed officially by his Cabinet. The speech eventually did use the important expressions that would have, if omitted, further exacerbated Japan’s relations with its East Asian neighbors. Although the terms “aggression”, “colonial rule”, “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” were mentioned his the speech, it was only in reference to the “position articulated by the previous cabinets” – not as his own.

In what some critics calls grammatical calculations, the text of the statement was crafted in such a way to avoid assigning responsibility for the devastation of war he described. In fact, the statement somewhat obscured the fact that Japan was the country responsible for aggression, colonial rule and the “comfort women” military sexual slavery system. This assessment was shared by many, including former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, who himself issued the 1995 landmark statement. “Fine phrases were written, but the statement does not say what the apology is for and what to do from now on,” he criticized.

ABE’S UN-APOLOGY – Abe did, however, explicitly called for an end to apology diplomacy. After insisting on the fact that “Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war,” he went on to say: “We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.”

IMPERIAL STATEMENT – By contrast, the short allocution by Emperor Akihito at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead sought to emphasize Japan’s need to address wartime history with humility and to reaffirm the country’s identity as a peace-loving nation. “Reflecting on our past and bearing in mind the feelings of deep remorse over the last war, I earnestly hope that the ravages of war will never be repeated,” he said, further paying “heartfelt tribute to all those who lost their lives in the war, both on the battlefields and elsewhere.”

REACTIONS TO ABE’S STATEMENT – Abe’s speech did not draw as sharp criticism as some had feared. A study carried out in Japan, China and South Korea suggests that, if Japanese opinion was divided (with a short majority viewing the statement favorably), a majority of the Chinese and Korean public were dissatisfied by the content of the speech.

At the official level, China, which had suggested any improvement in its relations with Japan would depend on the substance of Abe’s statement, only expressed moderate criticism. "Japan should have made an explicit statement on the nature of the war of militarism and aggression and should sincerely apologize … rather than being evasive on this major issue of principle," said Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying. South Korean President Park Geun-hye, for her part, said the statement “did not quite live up to our expectations” but overall welcomed the fact “that the position articulated by the previous Japanese cabinets… will remain unshakable into the future.” She nonetheless enjoined “the Japanese government to match (its statement) with consistent and sincere actions,” including by resolving the issue of comfort women.

CHINA’S V-DAY – Another closely watched commemorative event was China’s military parade grandly orchestrated on Tiananmen Square on September 3, with the presence some 30 heads of States. The event was a combination of military power display and nationalist fervor, with some 12,000 troops parading and a patriotic address by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Xi’s speech was heavy on anti-Japanese references, citing nine times the phrases “Japanese aggression” or “Japanese militarist aggressors” in reference to Japan’s wartime actions. He did not, however, make any explicit criticism of today’s Japan or mentioned current tensions between the two countries. He did, nonetheless, give a veiled response to Abe’s position on apology and the overall question of historical recognition when he said: “War is like a mirror. Looking at it helps us better appreciate the value of peace... We must learn the lessons of history and dedicate ourselves to peace.”

At the same time, in an attempt to ease the international concerns over China’s military expansion, Xi made the announcement that the country will downsize its military by 300,000 troops (a 13% cut), as a sign of China’s commitment to peaceful development. “No matter how much stronger we may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion,” he said.

REGIONAL IMPACT – Tokyo was quick in deploring Xi’s failure to include elements of reconciliation between Japan and China. But overall, despite the concerns over the impact the commemoration would have on regional relations, the commemorations did not escalate tensions between the three East Asian neighbors. However, they did not contribute to improving them either, as many had hoped.

Or have they? As South Korean President Park Geun-hye was in Beijing for the September 3 event, she and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to plan a trilateral summit with Japan this fall. The prospect offers some encouragement regarding the resumption of dialogue among the three countries.

Indeed, annual three-way summits have been suspended since May 2012 and President Park has refused to have one-on-one talks with Prime Minister Abe, due to what she considers his failure to acknowledge responsibility for Japan’s wartime actions.

TOWARDS REAL RECONCILIATION IN EAST ASIA – Improving regional relations will require building confidence. This will necessitate sincere, coordinated efforts towards reconciliation.

Over the years, civil society has played a crucial role in developing solidarity for peace at the grassroots level, with initiatives such as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) – Northeast Asia, the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI) and Peace and Green Boat. These groups, and other civil society and academic initiatives, also coordinated a variety of initiatives around the 70th anniversary in August. This timing also coincided with the 50th anniversary of the normalisation of ties between Japan and South Korea, which was marked by various symposiums, academic conferences and grassroots exchanges in the two countries also.

Many such civil society initiatives acknowledge the necessity to build mutually acceptable historical recognition and develop a shared vision for a common future. In this regard, they have recognized the important role Article 9 has played in addressing the root causes of the current tensions and fostering dialogue in the region.

Indeed, a future-oriented attitude toward history first requires coming to term with the past.

Read the ‘East Asia Peace Declaration’ issued at the 2015 International Conference for Peace in East Asia (Seoul, August 13, 2015)

Also read the Japan-Korea Citizens' Statement on the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II (Nagasaki, August 9, 2015)

Photo credit: Wilson Center

ACTION - PEACE BOAT'S APPEAL FROM THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ

As Peace Boat passed through the Strait of Hormuz on September 11, 200 participants and staff from 11 countries organized an onboard action to demonstrate opposition to the security bills currently proposed by the Japanese Government.

The Abe administration has used the hypothetical engagement of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in minesweeping operations in the Strait of Hormuz as a case to justify the exercise of collective self-defense overseas.

A few days prior to this action, Ela Gandhi (peace activist and granddaughter of Mahatma Gandhi), Mushakoji Kinhide (former Vice-Rector of the United Nations University), Carmelita Nuqui (Development Action for Women Network, DAWN), and Lalita Ramdas (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, CNDP) traveling onboard initiated a statement calling for peace and non-violence, and seeking non militaristic solutions to common problems.

Read more and download the appeal here.

LAUNCH OF ULAANBAATAR PROCESS FOR DIALOGUE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

On 23-24 June, peace activists and experts from China, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the United States of America and Mongolia gathered in Mongolia for a 2-day open and frank discussion on Northeast Asian peace and security issues and the role that civil society can play in addressing them.

This inaugural meeting of the Ulaanbaatar Process saw constructive debate and knowledge-sharing on issues of concern to the entire region, including the creation of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the replacement of the Korean War armistice with a permanent peace treaty.

Initiated by GPPAC, this civil society driven Ulaanbaatar Process serves as an effective regional Track 2 dialogue among civil society from throughout the region, including from all member states of the Six Party Talks. It offers a safe space and venue in which to reflect on how civil society can be strengthened and best contribute to the peace and security of the Northeast Asian region.

Read more here.

Picture credit: CGPPAC

STATEMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE INT'L DAY OF PEACE

On September 21, 2015, as the world celebrated the International Day of Peace, Peace Boat and the Global Article 9 Campaign issued a statement condemning in strongest terms the forceful passage in the Japanese Diet of security legislation that breaches Japan’s peace constitution.

The statement expresses utmost concerns at the possible repercussions the legislation will have on the region, and ask Japan and other countries in the region to refrain from any actions that would accelerate arms race and destabilize peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The two groups further express support for Japan’s civil society efforts to prevent the legislation from being implemented and Article 9 to be further eroded; and call on people around the world to support Japan’s vibrant mobilization towards the revocation of the bills, the preservation of Japan’s democracy and pacific values, and the safeguard of Article 9 as a regional and global peace mechanism.

Download the statement in English here.
Also read the statement in Japanese here.